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Gleave respectfully moves for a rehearing on the 
issue of punitive damages. In support of this motion, 
Gleave relies on the following: 
POINT I 
THIS COURTfS LEGAL FRAMEWORK IS CORRECT 
Gleave agrees with this Court's legal analysis. 
Specifically, this Court has ruled that: 
Before punitive damages may be awarded, 
the plaintiff must prove conduct that is 
willful and malicious or that manifests 
a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and disregard of, the rights of 
others . . • (Slip Opinion at p. 17.) 
POINT II 
RECONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE COURT REVIEWED 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE 
TO RIO GRANDE (INSTEAD OF GLEAVE) 
This Court correctly noted that the evidence 
should be reviewed in the light most favorable to 
Gleave: 
In reviewing the correctness of the 
trial court's grant of a directed 
verdict to Rio Grande on Gleave's 
punitive damage claim, we must view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to 
him [Gleave], the party against whom the 
motion was made. (Slip Opinion, at p. 
17.) 
However, it is respectfully submitted that the 
Court did not follow Gleave's version of the evidence. 
Rather, the Court followed Rio Grande's version of the 
evidence. 
A. NEAR MISSES 
The Court noted that plaintiff offered no evidence 
of "near misses." However, that statement was not true-
There was significant evidence of "near misses". 
(R. 1683-1686.)1 
In fact, there were eight prior "near misses". 
(One car had two separate near misses.) One of the "near 
misses" involved a mother and her children. Instead of a 
crushed leg, this case might easily have been about the 
death of a young family. 
Presumably, the train engineer was looking out his 
window and tooting his horn. Or in other words, Rio Grande 
had knowledge of each "near miss", because they saw it. 
xThe court refused to let the testimony go to the jury. 
However, plaintiff preserved the offer of proof. Today's 
opinion shows clearly that the evidence was relevant and the 
testimony should have been received. See Robinson v. 
Seaboard System R-R. Inc., 361 S.E. 2d 909 (N.C. App. 1987). 
2 
B. PRIOR INJURIES 
The opinion stresses that there were no accidents 
at the crossing up to the time of UDOT's inspection and 
evaluation in 1974.2 (Slip opinion at p. 19.) However, 
there were two accidents after that inspection, but prior to 
the Gleave accident. One of those accidents involved 
serious injuries. In the second accident, the car was only 
grazed. (R. 1685 . ) 
C. TEMPORARY STOP SIGN 
This Court stressed that Rio Grande had installed 
a stop sign to improve safety until flashing lights could be 
installed. (Slip Opinion at p. 19 0 T h e Court supposed 
this was evidence of good faith. 
However, there was evidence that the stop sign did 
little or nothing to improve safety. Before the stop sign 
was installed, the Utah County Surveyor wrote: 
2The Reply Brief of Rio Grande at p. 22 argued that 
"The uncontroverted evidence in this case is that there were 
no prior accidents at this crossing as of 1974 when the UDOT 
survey team recommended installation of a stop sign." That 
statement is true but misleading. The crucial time at issue 
is not before 1974 but after 1974. Thus, Rio Grande lead 
the Court into error. 
3 
It is also their feeling [County Road 
Commission] that very few people will 
pay attention to them [stop signs]. 
However, it would place responsibility 
on the driver if he violated the stop 
sign and was involved in an accident. 
(See plaintiff's Exhibit 12.) 
Compare Gleave's opening brief — red cover -- at 
p. 29. 
From this letter, a jury could infer that Rio 
Grande's purpose in placing the stop sign had nothing to do 
with public safety. Rather, Rio Grande's purpose was simply 
to get some legal protection from lawsuits. 
It was easy and cheap for Rio Grande to place a 
stop sign. However, Rio Grande knew that the crossing 
remained very dangerous even with the stop sign. (R. 
1238-1241.) Yet for over eight years, Rio Grande left that 
cheap and ineffective stop sign in place with no further 
safety measures. Indeed, there is evidence from which a 
jury could infer that the stop sign made the crossing more 
dangerous. (R. 1588-1589, 1606.) A jury might infer that 
to place a stop sign — and nothing more — was evidence of 
a cynical "public be damned" attitude on the part of the 
railroad. 
4 
D. RURAL LOCALITY 
This Court's opinion stressed " . . . The locality 
was rural, and the road was not heavily travelled. "3 in 
fact, the crossing is in a moderately built-up area of town 
and serves a residential subdivision. (See plaintiff's 
Exhibit 8. Compare Gleave's opening brief - red cover - at 
p. 28.) The jury could infer from the evidence that the 
road bears a medium amount of traffic — especially women 
and children. Certainly it is incorrect to regard this as a 
"rural" crossing. 
E. KNOWLEDGE OF DANGER 
This Court stressed that, "There is no evidence 
that Rio Grande knew or should have known of the facts 
discovered by Gleavefs expert . . ." (Slip Opinion at p. 
19.) Gleave concedes that punitive damages should not lie 
if Rio Grande had no knowledge of the danger. 
However, Rio Grande built the railroad and 
maintained it. A jury could easily infer that the builder 
of the railroad had actual knowledge of the danger. If not, 
the railroad was reckless for building a railroad without 
any thought or analysis of the public danger. 
3The Court was apparently led into this error by 
statements in the Brief of Appellant at p. 4. 
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Moreover, Gleave respectfully submits that the 
Court has overlooked the testimony of Joseph Yuhas. 
(Compare Gleave's opening brief - red cover - at p. 2 8.) 
Yuhas worked for the State of Utah. In 1975 (eight years 
before the accident), Yuhas met with a representative of Rio 
Grande at the crossing to make an official joint inspection. 
The purpose of the inspection was to inspect the safety of 
the crossing, including warning signs and sight distance. 
(R. 1238.) 
The specific findings of that inspection were: 
The sight distance, alignment of track 
and highway approach gradient, condition 
of the road surface and condition of the 
crossing are poor. (R. 1241.) 
Thus, Rio Grande knew as early as 1974 the 
specific danger at that crossing. Also, Rio Grande's 
engineer in charge of all trackage travelled over that 
specific curve between once each week and once each month 
for over ten years. (R. 1329.) (Compare Gleave's opening 
brief — red cover — at p. 28.) Finally, this specific 
crossing was inspected by Rio Grande on a regular basis. 
(R. 1326.) 
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A jury could easily infer that Rio Grande had 
actual knowledge of the danger. 
F. HIGHLY UNREASONABLE CONDUCT 
This Court's opinion stressed that there was no 
extreme departure from ordinary care- "At worst, the 
evidence shows errors of judgment . . . in failing to take 
steps to reduce the risks at this crossing-" (Slip Opinion 
at p- 19.) It is respectfully submitted that the jury 
might see it otherwise. 
One of plaintiff's experts testified that this was 
the worst out of thousands of crossings he had inspected. 
(Slip opinion at p. 8-) Without more, a jury might find 
that to be "highly unreasonable conduct." Furthermore, it 
would have been easy and cheap to improve safety. All Rio 
Grande had to do was light a match and burn the weeds which 
obstructed vision.4 (R. 1597.) 
Next, this was not a case where Rio Grande 
overlooked some safety procedures at a single intersection. 
Rather, this is a case where Rio Grande completely ignores 
^Plaintiff's expert also testified about additional 
types of improvements which could have been made. (R. 
1599-1600) 
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automobile safety at every crossing in Utah as a matter of 
policy. Rio Grande has no rules or regulations with respect 
to safety procedures for such blind crossings. (R. 1333.) 
For example, Rio Grande does not even consider such blind 
crossings in setting train speeds. (R. 1334.) Indeed, Rio 
Grande has no rules or regulations or standards at all with 
respect to automobile safety. (R. 1338.) 
A jury might do more than find this to be "highly 
unreasonable conduct." A jury might be outraged.5 After 
all, when a car and a train collide, the car never wins. 
G. PUBLIC OBJECTIVES 
This Court stated that, "Gleave has not directed 
our attention to any public objective which would clearly be 
5The failure to have any policy at all for automobile 
safety is in direct conflict with the laws of this state. 
This Court has stated: "The statute relied upon by Rio 
Grande does not relieve it of the duty to operate trains 
with reasonable care, nor does it prohibit Rio Grande from 
exercising reasonable care in the operation of its trains 
and the maintenance of its right-of-way. Rio Grande cannot 
ignore the public peril at a more than ordinarily hazardous 
crossing and excuse itself until UDOT takes action to 
upgrade the safety devices at the 1600 South crossing. Rio 
Grande remains subject to a standard of care which, under 
the circumstances of the crossing, could require actions to 
reduce risks imposed on the public." Slip Opinion at p. 6. 
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accomplished by an award of punitive damages herein." (Slip 
Opinion at p. 20.) 
It is respectfully submitted that there is a 
public objective. The public objective is to protect the 
public at all of the other railroad crossings in Utah. (See 
Gleave's opening brief — red cover — at p. 32.) 
There is evidence in this case that Rio Grande had 
actual knowledge of the danger. (See paragraph E above.) 
There is further evidence that Rio Grande has no rules or 
regulations or standards at all with respect to automobile 
safety. (See paragraph F above.) Thus, similar dangers may 
be lurking at hundreds of other railroad crossings in Utah. 
By permitting punitive damages now, lives may be 
saved tomorrow! Someone must teach Rio Grande that public 
safety comes before profits! 
H. SACRIFICING PUBLIC SAFETY TO SAVE MONEY 
The federal government has a program to pay for 
safety improvements at selected railroad crossings. Each 
year several crossings are improved or upgraded by these 
federal funds. The federal funds are applied first to the 
most dangerous crossings according to the state's study. 
(R. 1635 and R. 1336. ) 
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In one sense, this federal program has backfired. 
The railroad realizes that if they wait long enough, someone 
else (viz. the federal government) will pay to improve the 
safety at the railroad crossings. Therefore, the railroads 
have a powerful economic motive to do nothing -- or at least 
to do as little as possible. In this case, Rio Grande has 
candidly admitted that: 
. . . Rio Grande's desire to have a stop 
sign at the subject crossing made sense 
as a temporary measure. (i.e. until 
UDOT obtained federal funds to install 
active signals.) Reply Brief of Rio 
Grande at p. 22. 
Thus, in the face of a very dangerous crossing, 
Rio Grande took the cheapest and most ineffective possible 
safety measure — a stop sign was installed. Rio Grande 
wouldn't even pay to burn the weeds. (R. 1597.) 
Furthermore, Rio Grande wouldn't even consider slowing the 
trains no matter how dangerous the crossing. (R. 1334.) 
Accidents at railroad crossings are a major 
problem in Utah. However, there is a powerful economic 
incentive for a railroad to do little or nothing in the way 
of safety while waiting for federal funding. Such funding 
10 
can take a decade or more. In the meantime, the slaughter 
continues.° 
Punitive damages would be a powerful motive for 
Rio Grande and others to take reasonable steps for safety --
even while waiting for federal funding.^ 
Gleave has cited numerous cases from foreign 
jurisdictions which allow punitive damages in railroad 
crossing cases.^ (See Gleave's opening brief — red cover 
— at p. 31.) Those cases have a common thread which is 
applicable here: 
The jury was entitled to infer that [the 
railroad] had knowledge of the potential 
danger . . • and that it was consciously 
^This court can take judicial notice of the attached 
news reports. Rule 201(b) Utah Rules of Evidence. Judicial 
notice can be taken at any stage of the proceedings 
including the appellate stage. Rule 201 (f) Utah Rules of 
Evidence. According to the Provo Herald article, the Utah 
County Sheriff's office (where the Gleave accident took 
place), investigates a car/train accident once or twice per 
month. 
7This Court wrote: "We believe the substantial 
compensatory award will provide ample motivation for Rio 
Grande to take appropriate measures to protect the public 
and itself from a recurrence of this unfortunate accident." 
(Slip Opinion at p. 20.) It is respectfully suggested that 
a jury should make that determination. If a jury is so 
convinced, the jury would likely grant a small award or no 
award. 
Rio Grande has cited no contrary cases. 
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indifferent to the rights, welfare, and 
safety of such persons affected by the 
danger. Poole v Missouri Pacific 
Railroad Co., 638 S.W. 2d 10 (Tex 1982). 
POINT III 
THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE CLAIM CAN BE TRIED SEPARATELY 
The jury found Rio Grande to be 100% negligent, 
and Gleave 0% negligent. This court affirmed. If the 
punitive damage claim is resurrected, that claim can be 
tried separately. There is no reason to also send the 
liability issues back for trial. (See Gleave's opening 
brief — red cover — p. 33.) 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that this Court's 
opinion followed Rio Grande's version of the evidence. 
However, the Court should have followed Gleave's version of 
the evidence. This Court has written in this case: 
If, however, reasonable inferences 
supporting judgment for the losing party 
could be drawn from the evidence 
presented at trial, the directed verdict 
cannot be sustained. (Slip Opinion at 
p. 17.) 
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If the Court remains true to that standard, the 
Petition for Reconsideration must be granted. 
• -7 
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Ralph Nightingale survived this collision with an Amtrak train Monday near American Fork. 
Doug Land Photo 
Officials cite safety program 
following train-truck accident 
By PATRICK CHRISTIAN 
Herald Staff Writer ( ~T - n * 7 I 
A Utah County Sheriff's patrol sergeant says 
there are too many accidents between two-ton 
automobiles or pickups and trains that may weigh 
between 3,000 and 10 000 tons like the one that left a 
Spnngville man in critical condition Monday 
Ralph H Nightingale, 31, of Spnngville was 
critically injured Monday morning when his pickup 
truck was struck by a southbound passenger train on 
a rural county road near American Fork 
His condition was upgraded this morning to 
serious but stable 
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
crossing was marked by two stationary signs and the 
train was blowing its whistle, said a sheriff's 
investigator 
'We seem to investigate a car/train accident 
once or twice a month, said Patrol Sergeant Doug 
Witney, who indicated that's too many 
Witney says his past investigations have led him 
to conclude that there are three main reasons for 
trams ramming automobiles 
The first reason is simply that drivers simply 
don t have their minds on driving and fail to notice 
railroad signs, tracks and even a train with it s 
whistle blaring, he says 
A second reason he gives is that the driver has 
ronsumed too much alcohol and his reasoning and 
reaction abilities are deadened 
Reason three is that familiarity breeds compla-
cency What happens is a driver is so familiar with 
the route because they drive it day after day that 
they drive it almost automatically without paying 
full attention ' 
Dick Tincher, director of public relations tor 
Union Pacific Railroad, said all railroads in Utah 
are working with governmental organizations con-
cerned with safety in a program called Operation 
Life Safety " 
He said the program was kicked otf in May in 
Utah and aims to increase driver awareness of the 
dangers of not paying attention to moving trains 
"Between 1982 and 1987 there were 23 people 
killed and 106 people injured in 259 accidents in Utah 
involving trains and other vehicles, said Tincher 
He said 36 percent of these kinds ot accidents 
actually happen at crossings with flashing lights and 
gates because motorists still try to go around the 
gates and try to beat a fast moving tram across the 
track 
He said that 39 percent of these accidents have 
occurred at night and in 25 percent ot the accidents 
drivers actually ran into the side of a tram that was 
already in the process of crossmg the road 
Tincher said it's often difficult to judge the speed 
of an oncoming tram He said many of them are 
legally doing 65 to 70 mph when they cross a 
roadway He compared a tram hittmg an automobile 
with an automobile running over an aluminium can 
"In our program, we try to emphasize that a 
driver should always pay attention when crossmg 
any tracks and realize a tram could be coming We 
say,4Anytime is tram time 
"We also emphasize that only the driver has a 
choice. The engineer cannot veer to the right or left 
to miss a vehicle and it usually takes a half-mile to 
as much as a mile and a half to stop a 10,000-ton 
tram 
'It is the motorist who has to pay attention to the 
railroad signs placed at everv crossmg and to watch 
for trains if these kinds of accidents are to be 
reduced,' Tincher concluded 
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